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A B S T R A C T
This comparative analysis examines how large-scale agricultural land acqui-
sitions are implemented in Ghana and Kenya, using embedded case studies
of two speciﬁc investment projects. We ﬁnd that insufﬁciencies in these
countries’ land governance systems are partly caused by discrepancies
between de jure and de facto procedures and that powerful actors tend to
operate in the legal grey areas. These actors determine the implementation
of projects to a large extent. Displacement and compensation are highly
emotive issues that exacerbate tensions around the investment. We also ﬁnd
that large-scale land acquisitions have a feedback effect on the land governance
system, which suggests that large-scale land acquisitions can be drivers of insti-
tutional change. We suggest there may be a window of opportunity here to
reform these land governance systems.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, an increased demand for agricultural land has fuelled
fears of a neo-colonial land rush, in particular in African countries. At
the same time, it has raised hopes for a renewed interest in developing
countries’ chronically under-invested agricultural sectors.
A broad research community has analysed the reasons for this
increased demand. Studies by von Braun & Meinzen-Dick (),
Cotula et al. (), Zoomers (), Cotula & Vermeulen ()
and Deininger et al. () have revealed several drivers of the phenom-
enon: rapid population growth, a strong trend towards urbanisation,
changing dietary preferences and environmental concerns such as
severe land degradation, desertiﬁcation and water shortages. Added to
these are the increasing global and local demands for food, raw
materials, forest products, renewable energy sources, ecosystem services,
eco-tourism and investment. These demands often meet willing suppli-
ers in developing countries who aim to commercialise under-ﬁnanced
agricultural sectors, promote rural development, create employment,
build infrastructure, transfer technology and bring in tax income
(Görgen et al. ; Deininger & Byerlee ).
While we thus have some evidence about the drivers, evidence about
the outcomes of land-based investments is scarce (exceptions are
Schoneveld et al. ; Mujenja & Wonani ; FAO ). Some
civil society organisations have voiced cautions about possible negative
impacts for host countries and the local population, such as displace-
ment, destruction of livelihoods, tax evasion or increasing dependency
through labour contracts (for Ghana: FIAN International, b; for
Kenya: FIAN International, a), but a balanced assessment of
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positive and negative effects is missing. Additional rigorous analyses of
the processes associated with large-scale land transactions are needed
(building on work from German et al.,  and Nolte, ). As the
characteristics of such procedures are expected to be an important
determinant of outcomes, a better understanding of the processes is a
precondition for informed discussions and evaluation.
Thus, the question ‘How are land deals implemented?’ guides our
analysis. We analyse the implementation of speciﬁc land acquisitions
in Ghana and Kenya against the background of the respective national
land governance system.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: we explain our method-
ology and present the data. Then, we provide evidence on the under-
lying processes of individual investment cases in Ghana and Kenya
and their implications. We conclude this paper with a comparative
analysis.
M E T H O D O L O G Y A N D D A T A
We use a comparative case study design (Dion ; Levy ; Gerring
et al. ) that is based on two investment cases in two African
countries. In choosing the countries, we aimed for a close similarity
with regard to the contextual factors we expected to have an inﬂuence
on the not yet well-understood phenomenon of large-scale land acqui-
sitions (Dion ). Ghana and Kenya largely satisfy this condition as
they are both important targets of land acquisitions in Africa
(Anseeuw et al. ). They also claim leadership in their respective
regional economic communities and have a reasonable degree of
macro-economic stability with access to the sea (Mehler et al. ).
Both are former British colonies and have inherited comparable insti-
tutional settings (Republic of Ghana ; Republic of Kenya ).
In addition, the coexistence of statutory and customary laws marks
their land governance systems, which are both undergoing institutional
change (Republic of Ghana ; Republic of Kenya ). However,
their customary systems differ: while land allocation via the chieftaincy
system is still crucial to Ghana (Ray ; Kasanga & Kotey ), tra-
ditional land allocation only plays a minor role in Kenya.
For each country, we concentrate on one investment project initiated
by a Western investor in a rural area, which gives us an embedded case
study (see Yin : –). Comparing the two projects in the context of
their respective countries allows us to examine the complex processes
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involved in land transactions more comprehensively than a single case
would; it also provides better grounded insights into the functioning
of the land governance systems in general and interactions between sta-
keholders in particular. It also gives us better grounds for generalising
about the mechanisms that guide acquisition processes in countries
with comparable institutional characteristics. In this regard, we consider
our study to be in line with Gerring’s () pathway case, in which he
examines a crucial case to clarify a hypothesis. Similarly, our study eluci-
dates the causal mechanisms that underlie processes of large-scale land
acquisitions.
Our empirical analysis draws on legal documents and on primary data
gathered during ﬁeld research in Ghana and Kenya in  and .
To understand the de facto practices involved in land acquisitions, we
conducted semi-structured interviews (in Ghana  and in Kenya )
with a wide range of stakeholders at the national and local levels. In
addition, we facilitated focus group discussions (in Ghana  and in
Kenya ) with farmers in the region directly affected by the particular
investment project and with employees of the investors.
Land deals are implemented within a complex land governance
system. To explain the mechanisms that drive large-scale land acqui-
sition, we provide very brief insights into land governance and land
acquisitions in both countries. Next, we delve into the two cases, the
Ghana Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) in Ghana and
Dominion Farms in Kenya. For these case studies, we investigate the
process of acquiring land. We then shed light on the immediate reper-
cussions of the investment – displacement and compensation – and
further discuss local people’s perceptions of the welfare implications.
These perceptions can hint at transmission channels of our speciﬁc
investment projects. An analytical section compares these aspects in
our two cases.
I N S I G H T S F R O M G H A N A
Land governance and land acquisitions in Ghana
After independence, state land was maintained by post-independence
rulers and governed by the State Lands Act (No.  of ) for
public lands (Republic of Ghana b) and the Administration of
Lands Act (No.  of ) for vested lands (Republic of Ghana
a). Vested land is land where the state acquired the management
functions by law, while the ownership emanating from custom, that is
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the allodial title, stays with the chief and entitles him to receive ground
rents. In general, leaseholds under common law, of both state and cus-
tomary land, can be granted for up to  years for Ghanaians and 
years for foreigners (Republic of Ghana : Art.  ()).
Currently, state land in Ghana accounts for roughly % of the land
surface, while the remaining % falls under customary land held by
stools (in southern Ghana), skins (in northern Ghana) or families (for
instance in the Volta Region) (Kasanga & Kotey ; Aryeetey et al.
b). Although these ﬁgures are rough estimates, they underline
the strong role of the customary system to date (Anyidoho et al. ;
Ubink & Amanor ).
Over time,  pieces of land legislation were developed but, given
the overlaps and loopholes, did not result in an efﬁcient formal land
rights system (Quaye ). This multitude of Acts and their ambiguity
have been hampering proper enforcement of land laws and regulations
for decades, so people have become used to acting in legal grey areas
(Interviews G, G). In , the Government of Ghana recognised
shortcomings in its National Land Policy (Republic of Ghana ) and
this led to the initiation of a Land Administration Project (LAP) with
World Bank support in the year  (Aryeetey et al. a; Bugri
). A comprehensive legal framework is currently being developed.
The ﬁrst step for investors in quest of land is to identify available land.
For this task, it is usual to engage local professionals with a wide-ranging
network (Interviews G, G). Another possibility for foreigners is to
approach the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, which is currently
improving a database capturing customary land offered for investment
projects (Interviews G, G, G; GIPC ).
As the majority of land in Ghana is customary land, potential investors
have to negotiate in most cases with chiefs and paramount chiefs and
have to bargain over the amount of the ‘drink money’, which is necess-
ary to seal a land deal according to customary rules (Interviews G,
G, G; for examples: Schoneveld et al. ; Amanor ;
Wisborg ; Berry ). The term ‘drink money’ originally meant
a physical drink but now symbolises asking permission to approach the
chief in good will (Interviews G, G; Amanor ). Nowadays, the
‘drink’ is converted into ﬁnancial terms. With growing pressure on
land the amount is increasing and translates to a substantial part of
the acquisition costs (Interviews G, G, G; Ubink & Quan ).
By custom, the traditional council and the elders need to agree to
negotiations in order to guarantee checks and balances (Interviews
G, G; Kasanga & Kotey ). However, de facto accountability
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can be weak: For instance, it is up to the chiefs whether they disclose the
amount and the intended use of the ‘drink money’ (Interviews G,
G; Berry ). Moreover, it is up to the chiefs and the traditional
councils (and the investors) to decide whether they will seek free,
prior and informed consent, so the local population is at risk of
hearing about a deal only after the negotiation has been concluded
(Interviews G, G). In addition, chiefs usually do not have access
to information on the market value of land during their negotiations
for sufﬁcient ‘drink money’, land rents and other beneﬁts (e.g. local
employment quotas, contract farming schemes, equity shares and cor-
porate social responsibility) (Interview G).
In the second step, the investor receives the site plan from the chief
and must initiate a comprehensive search at the archives of the Lands
Commission, to check that the negotiating party is the legal owner
and that there are not multiple claims on the land (Interviews G,
G, G; Republic of Ghana ). Further checks with the Town
and Country Planning Department are necessary to ascertain whether
the land is available for the intended economic activity (Interviews
G, G; Republic of Ghana ).
If everything is in order, a licensed surveyor is engaged to map the
land (Interviews G, G; Republic of Ghana ). According to
custom, negotiations are concluded with the payment of ‘drink
money’ (Interviews G, G, G; Ubink & Quan, ). Once
details have been agreed upon, the documents have to be handed in
to the Regional Lands Commission to process the registration. If the
land is located around Accra or Kumasi a title can be issued; in other
parts of Ghana only deed registration is available (Interviews G,
G; Kasanga & Kotey ). Title registration is conditional on
announcing the transaction details at the site itself, at the respective dis-
trict assembly and at the Regional Lands Commission. When  days
have passed without any objection being raised, the registration
process can be completed (Interview G; Republic of Ghana ).
The annual rent, which is conﬁrmed by the Lands Commission in the
leasehold, will be paid to the Ofﬁce of the Administrator of Stool Lands
(Interviews G, G; Republic of Ghana a). This authority
charges a % administrative fee. The rent is disbursed as follows:
% to the district assembly, % to the chief and % to the traditional
council (Interviews G, G, G; Republic of Ghana a).
After a land lease has ﬁnally been issued, an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) is mandatory. Actors such as the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Water Resource Commission thus have a
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say in regulating future land use (Interviews G, G; Republic of
Ghana b, ).
Since electronic data management and transmission is still weak in
Ghana, processing documents is time intensive (Interviews G, G,
G). In addition, monitoring and sanctioning of regulations remains
a challenge due to a lack of personal and ﬁnancial resources
(Interview G; Environmental Protection Agency ; for the
mining sector see Domfeh ). Therefore suitable grounds exist for
offers of ‘speed money’, and rent-seeking exists at various levels, foster-
ing fraud such as multiple sales of land or incomplete registration.
Process of acquiring land in the case of GOPDC
Ghana Oil Palm Development Company (GOPDC) is the leading palm
oil producer and the biggest company in Kwaebibirem District, a remote
area in the Eastern Region of Ghana. It was established as a state-owned
company in  on an area of , hectares, known as the Kwae
Concession (Registered Leasehold No. /). In the wave of lib-
eralisation, GOPDC was privatised in  and the  years leasehold
(Republic of Ghana ) was divested to the Belgian investor Société
d’Investissement pour l’Agriculture Tropicale, which took over the majority
of shares (GOPDC ; SIAT ).
This analysis focuses on Okumaning Concession, which was GOPDC’s
second concession and acquired in . It covers , hectares of
vested land which were leased for  years from the government
(Registered Deed RE /). Originally, the land of Okumaning
Concession was fully under the control of Okumaning, Takworase and
Kusi stools, but the government acquired the land under the
Administration of Lands Act (No.  of ) in  and was thus
entitled to lease the land to GOPDC.
The difﬁculty with acquisitions of vested land under Act No.  of
 is the creation of overlapping interests in land, as mentioned
earlier. The allodial titles remain in the hands of the chiefs, while man-
agement functions come under the remit of the state (which in this case
were leased out to GOPDC). Altogether, the role of the chiefs is very
complex: they negotiate corporate social responsibility activities with
GOPDC (Interviews G, G, G) and are (according to custom)
highly appreciated by the population (Interview G). However, some
chiefs have been criticised and had their legitimacy questioned by the
people (Interview G; FGDs G, G, G, G) due to misusing their pos-
itions for personal beneﬁt. In one particular case, this malfeasance
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included chiefs renting out to migrants portions of land GOPDC had not
yet cultivated, despite receiving ground rent from GOPDC through state
agencies.
With regard to GOPDC’s acquisition of the Okumaning Concession,
our focus group discussions revealed a lack of free, prior and informed
consent. While some people had been informed in a meeting with
GOPDC (FGD G), others had only heard about the investment
project from their chiefs (FGD G) or, even worse, had only become
aware of the acquisition when the Land Valuation Board came in to esti-
mate the worth of their land for compensation purposes (FGD G). The
whole process, beginning with information and sensitisation, was charac-
terised by a lack of transparency and the presence of many irregularities
and delays.
Although GOPDC appears to have adhered to all other mandatory
legal procedures, there may have been a few instances where they did
not comply. For example, the Environmental Management Plan
requires that quarterly reports on, for example, efﬂuent treatment are
sent to the Environmental Protection Agency (Interviews G, G).
According to the agency, these reports reveal that GOPDC was ﬁned
several years ago (Interviews G, G). GOPDC is also required to
renew all necessary water permits on a regular basis. However, the
Water Resource Commission stated that there had once been a delay
of a few months (Interview G).
Implications of the GOPDC investment
Once GOPDC took over the assets and liabilities for the Okumaning
Concession from the state, it had the duty to compensate everybody
who lived and farmed on the concession. The people living in this spar-
sely populated area were predominantly migrants. As these migrants
were not bound to the land by social ties, they favoured cash compen-
sation over the resettlement plan suggested by GOPDC (A.Y. &
A. Consult ; Interview G; FGD G). Consequently, the Land
Valuation Board surveyed crops and housing structures but not the
land itself (Interviews G–G, G, G; FGDs G–G). This was
because GOPDC already possessed the leasehold for the land and the
migrants had neither statutory nor ancestral rights to use the land
(Kobo ). The amounts calculated by the Land Valuation Board
were perceived to be inadequate to restore the migrants’ livelihoods
(FGDs G–G, G). Furthermore, people who used to live or farm
on Okumaning Concession reported that they did not receive
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compensation until ﬁve years after they had left the land (FGDs G, G–
G). The fact that people only received a cheque with the aggregated
sum (FGDs G–G, G) increased the suspicion that they were being
tricked by their own government.
Nevertheless, GOPDC is perceived to be a driver of development in
the region by the local population (Interviews G–G, G, G, G,
G; FGDs G–G, G, G, G–G). It not only runs a nucleus
estate system with more than , plantation workers, in order to
run the mill efﬁciently and foster economic integration, GOPDC has
also increased its access to fresh oil palm fruit by contracting more
than , outgrower farmers (Interviews G, G). Moreover, the
company also makes purchases from independent oil palm farmers.
According to Väth (), however, beneﬁts from GOPDC are not
equally distributed amongst the local population, which has led to wide-
spread resentment against the investment (FGDs G–G). These issues
range from decreasing access to agricultural land (FGDs G–G) to
increased food prices in the area (FGDs G–G) to low prices for
fresh oil palm fruit (Interview G; FGDs G, G). Other sources of cri-
ticism are low wages (FGDs G–G, G), casual labour contracts (FGDs
G–G, G, G, G), a lack of corporate social responsibility (FGDs
G–G) and inadequate and late compensation (FGDs G–G).
Nonetheless, in most of the focus group discussions participants did
not deny the existence of beneﬁts like employment creation (FGDs
G–G, G–G), better road infrastructure (FGDs G–G, G, G,
G–G), electricity (FGDs G–G, G, G, G) and improved
health and schooling facilities (FGDs G–G, G–G).
Criticism is not limited to GOPDC but includes the chiefs and the gov-
ernment. As a focus group participant said, ‘the chief has misled [us],
the investor could not know. A portion of blame can be also given to
the government’ (FGD G). Given the crucial position of chiefs,
beneﬁts for the local population are not institutionalised but rather
depend on chiefs’ goodwill and capacity to negotiate.
I N S I G H T S F R O M K E N Y A
Land governance and land acquisitions in Kenya
After independence the dual system of land tenure – consisting of statu-
tory and customary tenure with a multitude of (sometimes contradic-
tory) statutes (Republic of Kenya ) – was maintained. Land
remained a source of conﬂict, particularly in the case of ‘elite land
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grabbing’; that is, fraudulent allocation of public land to economically
or politically inﬂuential people (Republic of Kenya a; Manji
), or the / post-election violence that is thought to
have been fuelled by land issues (Kanyinga ).
Today, there are three categories of land: public land (about % of
the total land surface), private land (about %) and community land
(about %) (Republic of Kenya b). There are approximately six
million titles on private land (stemming from both public and commu-
nity land) (Interview K) and a great deal of fraud surrounding them:
often, there are numerous titles for one piece of land.
At the time of writing, Kenya is in the middle of a land law reform
process (Manji ). The policy road map is outlined in the
National Land Policy of  (Republic of Kenya ) and in the
new Constitution of  (Republic of Kenya , Art.  (); Glinz
) – high hopes are placed on both. However, this only partly
enacted constitution adds to the confusion about land management,
as old and new constitutions coexist.
The government encourages investors in agriculture and facilitates
the process through the Kenya Investment Authority (Interviews K,
K). Investors usually take long-term leases to secure access to land
for up to  years (Interview K). Who the investor will negotiate with
depends on the type of land targeted. Since our case study targets com-
munity land, we concentrate on the latter in what follows.
For community land, the county council or another mandated insti-
tution negotiates with the investor. These local authorities are also
entrusted with informing the involved local population. However,
whether the population is informed about an investment largely
depends on individuals in these institutions (Interview K), as the
National Land Policy states: ‘In addition, it [the institutional framework]
does not adequately involve the public in decision making with respect
to land administration and management, and is thus unaccountable’
(Republic of Kenya ). Until , the new constitution stipulates
that the Community Land Bill – which is available in a zero draft
version –must be enacted (Republic of Kenya ). Administration
of community land is then to be handled by community land boards.
In all cases of investment in land – public, community or private – the
Ministry of Lands has to approve the transaction, register the land and
issue a lease certiﬁcate. Once the lease has been taken and before the
project actually starts, the investor has to undertake an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) with the National Environment Management
Authority (Interview K). The EIA includes social aspects, and involves
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the adjacent population. It has to make a clear statement of expected
impacts and mitigation measures. The Water Resources Management
Authority handles water usage rights and water licences (Interview K).
As a result of a tedious ofﬁcial process and a confusing legal situation
in Kenya, many investments skip ofﬁcial procedures and come into the
country through high-level personal contacts (Interviews K, K). For
instance, there is the case of a Qatari investment that was negotiated on
the government level. Public pressure caused this deal to fail (Interviews
K, K, K).
Process of acquiring land in the case of Dominion Farms
The large-scale rice producer, Dominion Farms, is ‘an investor who
came in through the back door’ (Interview K) and exhibited a
rather unusual way of entering the country. Dominion Farms is
located in the area of Siaya and Bondo District in Nyanza Province.
The community land is held in trust by the respective county councils.
Formerly, seasonal ﬂooding meant that the swampland adjacent to
Lake Victoria could only be used seasonally and few people were
living on the land. The community used the land for grazing animals,
ﬁshing and agriculture in the dry season. Local authorities have had
plans to develop the swampland for agriculture for a long time;
however, all former projects had failed (Interviews K, K, K).
Dominion Farms, a privately held US-investment, took over the land
from the parastatal, Lake Basin Development Authority, in 
(Interview K). Dominion holds a -year lease of , hectares
that it has gradually been reclaiming, with about , hectares being
in use in  (Interview K). The owner claims God sent him to
Africa to help poor people (Interview K). When Dominion ﬁrst came
to Kenya, the owner looked for support in the highest political ranks
of the country and approached Oburo Odinga, Member of Parliament
for the region at the time. Oburo Odinga approved the investment
and linked Dominion up with the Investment Promotion Centre. This
in turn facilitated contact with the county councils (Interviews K,
K). In , Dominion signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with the County Council of Siaya and the County Council of
Bondo (Dominion Farms et al. ).
The local community was informed through church channels – in the
words of one interviewee, ‘they used religion to manifest the investment’
(Interview K). The owner went into partnership with a local priest and
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held services in the area to inform the population about the project
(Interview K; FGDs K, K). This priest later became MP in Kisumu
Town – some claim through support and for the beneﬁt of Dominion
(Interview K).
Whether Dominion complied with the law when they negotiated the
MoU and whether they did their EIAs as required is impossible to recon-
struct from hindsight. Dominion and the National Environment
Management Authority claim that EIAs were conducted in an orderly
manner (Interviews K, K–K, K, K, K). However, others
argue that EIAs were not done properly. Accusations have been made
that ofﬁcial documents on public consultation were prepared in retro-
spect (Interview K) or that ofﬁcials were bribed (Interview K).
Implications of Dominion Farms
In the case of Dominion Farms, the information we have on displace-
ment is somewhat contradictory: most focus group interviewees and par-
ticipants stated that no one was living on the land and that only farming
activities took place (Interviews K, K, K; FGDs K-K). However,
during a focus group discussion with permanent employees of
Dominion, a participant claimed that people ‘next to the lake […]
were displaced but they agreed with Dominion and were paid’ (FGD
K). This was conﬁrmed by one female participant during a focus
group discussion who claims she was displaced from the area around
Lake Kanyaboli (FGD K). Hence, we can deduce from the information
obtained in our focus group discussions that displacement occurred in
only very few cases around the lake. Even if the number of people dis-
placed was limited, the land used by Dominion blocks routes and is no
longer available for communal use such as pastoral activities, ﬁshing
or seasonal agriculture during the dry months (Interviews K, K;
FGDs K, K).
Although displacement was initially a minor problem, it continues
to play a role due to the fact that Dominion’s clearing and draining of
the land has rendered it arable, which has seen more and more
people move into those areas (Interviews K, K, K; FGD K).
This has led to Dominion calling on the police and local authorities
to drive these settlers out (Interviews K, K). Many blame
Dominion for this messy situation; others hold the government respon-
sible (FGD K).
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Unlike in Ghana, compensation was a minor issue since displacement
did not affect many families. Some have estimated that only a few
people received compensation (FGD K; Interviews K, K, K).
Generally speaking, an obligation to provide compensation only
emerges if the land in question is privately titled; this is not the case
with community land where the county councils are responsible
(Interview K). In the MoU, the county councils oblige Dominion
Farms ‘to identify and set aside at least  acres for each of the
Councils for the use of the local community’ (Dominion Farms
et al. ). Although a senior ofﬁcial in the County Council of
Siaya has conﬁrmed this (Interview K ), a lawyer familiar with
Dominion Farms explained that ‘the main problem is that
Dominion wants to take back the  acres. Dominion is saying that
this was the agreement. The problem is that the boundaries of the
 acres are not clearly deﬁned’ (Interview K). There was no
obvious reference to these areas in any of the focus group discussions.
However, conﬂicting land claims were raised numerous times and rep-
resent a major issue in the area (Interviews K, K-K, K; FGDs
K, K, K, K). Besides this, the MoU requires Dominion Farms to
rehabilitate ‘at least one public primary school and at least one
public health facility for each of the Councils to Government stan-
dards’ (Dominion Farms et al. ). Both focus group discussions
provided ample evidence of hospital and school improvement,
which we discuss in more detail below.
During most focus group discussions and interviews, frustration about
the lack of compensation was expressed (Interview K; FGDs K, K).
Even though Dominion Farms does not hold any ofﬁcial responsibility to
compensate for community land, the community still has a sense of own-
ership and feels betrayed.
The local population’s perception of Dominion Farms changed over
time. In the beginning, there was largely a sense of enthusiasm with
regard to Dominion Farms – clearly the most inﬂuential project in the
region. However, there were fewer employment opportunities once
the project moved from the construction phase to actual farming activi-
ties, which saw frustration set in amongst the community. As one focus
group participant explained, ‘the negativity came in  during the
transition between construction and farming when most of the
workers became redundant and they could not all continue working
with Dominion’ (FGD K). Strong resistance to the project amongst
community members (see for example Ochieng ) has increased
over the last few years (Interview K).
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Today mainly adverse impacts, such as the loss of access to land, food
insecurity, and damage to health caused by chemicals and working in the
rice ﬁelds, are at the centre of the debate. While statements like ‘Of
course Dominion is very negative – that I have no doubt about – when
they came they were good but they have kept on deteriorating year by
year’ (FGD K) were frequent in conversations with affected commu-
nities, positive impacts could not be denied at the same time. Long-
term improvements in employment, and in infrastructure, such as
roads, access to electricity, health centres and schools, were named in
particular (Interviews K–K; FGDs K–K). According to the
season, between  and , permanent, contract and casual employ-
ees are working for Dominion (Interviews K, K).
A N A L Y S I S
To align our analysis, we start with a systematic comparison between our
two cases from Ghana and Kenya and derive some recommendations.
In neither country was the land governance system prepared to
handle large-scale land acquisitions. In fact, the increased demand for
land exposed their institutional weaknesses. The evidence shows that
in both Ghana and Kenya de facto procedures were generally followed,
which did not conform to the de jure procedures laid down by legislation
in each country. Many actors involved in land deals were therefore oper-
ating in legal grey areas. This was partly because the present land govern-
ance systems are not equipped to cope with the challenges of increasing
pressure on land resources. The relevant legislation in both countries is
confusing, and formal rules are poorly implemented and enforced. Thus
investors, local authorities and national authorities all have an incentive
to skip ofﬁcial procedure. In the case of Dominion Farms, for instance,
the investor entered the country in a rather unusual way.
During the acquisition process, powerful actors, including local and
national authorities and investors, determine to a large extent speciﬁc
investment projects. They have substantial inﬂuence on crucial
aspects, such as informing the local population and being environmen-
tally accountable. Depending on the capabilities and preferences of
respective actors and on their access to information, this can affect
project implementation in terms of consultation of the local commu-
nities, compensation and displacement, welfare and environmental
implications. For example, chiefs in Ghana and county councils in
Kenya negotiated on behalf of their respective local communities.
Whether the communities were informed and compensated was
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decided on by these powerful actors and investors. Our case studies
revealed that this is often not to the advantage of the local population.
Although some local authorities and chiefs can be accused of negotiat-
ing for their personal beneﬁt at the expense of the wider community,
it is questionable to what extent they are able to fully grasp the impli-
cations of a particular land deal or possess the negotiation skills required
to bargain accordingly.
In both cases displacement was kept to a minimum: in the case of
GOPDC the land acquired was only sparsely populated by migrants; in
the case of Dominion Farms, it was swampland that was only used for sea-
sonal farming activities. Nonetheless, Dominion learned that conﬂicts
over land can arise in the course of project implementation – in their
case this consisted of people settling in the area once it had been
reclaimed. GOPDC similarly witnessed a gradual increase in tensions
during project implementation.
In comparing the two cases, we found that differences exist in the
compensation schemes. GOPDC, for instance, was responsible for com-
pensating all those who farmed and lived in the area. Migrants opted
for compensation payments that were ﬁxed by the Land Valuation
Board, though they claimed that they were inadequate and late.
Dominion Farms, on the other hand, was not ofﬁcially responsible for
compensation; rather county councils were since Dominion had
acquired community land. Hence, Dominion Farms and the county
councils agreed on compensation schemes in the MoU, including
land for the local population and improvements in health and edu-
cation. In both cases, the local population feels there should be more
compensation.
We conclude that displacement and compensation are highly emotive
issues that easily lead to discontent and conﬂict. In both cases, tensions
over land exacerbated in the course of project implementation, while
dissatisfaction with compensation levels persisted even though the com-
panies had invested in local infrastructure. This highlights the impor-
tance of adequately consulting and including local populations in the
process.
Based on local populations’ perceptions of the welfare implications,
we can conclude that both projects were initially welcomed with a
degree of enthusiasm. However, some problems set in after only a few
years. Moreover, we can identify the following channels through which
communities are affected by investment projects: access to land, food
and input prices, food security, employment opportunities and infra-
structure improvements (roads, electricity, health and school facilities).
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These insights suggest that perceptions of welfare implications change
over time and are extremely subjective. Thus to better evaluate this
area, more research on long-term impacts is needed.
In both countries and in both investment cases a lot of dissatisfaction
was expressed with not only the investors but also with the traditional
authorities and the governments. This discontent may be feeding back
into the land governance system. Both countries show signs of transition:
the Lands Commission of Ghana was, at the time of writing, drafting a
new land bill in order to coordinate its various and occasionally overlap-
ping pieces of land legislation (Republic of Ghana ). The same
holds for Kenya, which has enacted – and is currently implementing –
a new constitution that addresses important land issues (Republic of
Kenya ). The ﬁrst steps towards reform have been taken, but it is
not yet clear whether such reform will be implemented completely. In
Kenya, for instance, there is concern that established elites will keep
the old institutions alive despite the new constitution (Boone ;
Interviews K, K). Similarly, within Ghanaian civil society there is a
fear that those in power have intentionally withheld the draft bill in
order to hold on to the power guaranteed by the current system
(Interview G).
Traditional authorities, as alluded to above, are also under pressure.
The Ghanaian system, for instance, is backed by strong customary
rules that are widely accepted by the society due to a long tradition of
chiefs who have used their inﬂuence to enhance the welfare of their sub-
jects. Nevertheless, some traditional authorities’ behaviour as regards
the leasing of land to investors has seen trust in the customary insti-
tutions decrease. Thus, a large number of land disputes testify to the
fact that the role of chief is nowadays heavily debated and criticised.
This increased scrutiny could lead to a slow change in the rules.
We thus assert that large-scale land acquisitions can fuel institutional
change by placing signiﬁcant pressure on the land governance system,
which subsequently seeks to adapt to cope with this pressure; or, put dif-
ferently, investments have a feedback effect on the system. We suggest
there may be a window of opportunity here for policymakers, investors,
and the local population to discuss the land governance system and shift
its parameters towards greater efﬁciency given the sub-optimal outcomes
of many investments. From a scientiﬁc point of view, however, more
research is needed to fully understand how the recent investment
boom in agricultural land has affected the future investment climate
and the underlying regulatory framework.
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N O T E S
. See the appendix for a full list of interviewees and focus group participants. In the Kenyan
investment case, two districts were affected: Siaya and Bondo. However, we only conducted focus
group discussions in Siaya District, hence our results are biased towards Siaya. Potential ﬁndings
for Bondo may have revealed differences.
. The present constitution also recognises private land under common law. Such land falls under
the category of customary land because it originates from gift or sale by the allodial right holder
before . A freehold title under common law can be held only by Ghanaians (Republic of
Ghana : Art.  ()).
. While the Ofﬁce of the Administrator of Stool Lands Act (No.  of ) (Republic of Ghana
a) and the Lands Commission Act (No.  of ) (Republic of Ghana ) have contrib-
uted to institutional clarity, the Land Use Planning Bill (Republic of Ghana ) is under review
and the Land Bill is in a third draft stage (Republic of Ghana ). The Land Bill is expected to
reconcile the customary and statutory systems and to improve land registration and the transparency
of land transactions in order to reduce conﬂicts arising from overlapping claims, as well as fraud in
the form of double registration and corruption (Interviews G, G, G).
. The land was expropriated from the stools of Kwae, Asuom, Anweam, and Mintah under the
State Lands Act (No.  of ) by the Government of Ghana to develop the area (Interviews
G, G). As land acquisitions under this Act are ultimate, the stool land was ﬁnally transformed
into public land. Under the military rule of the late s, compensation of the stools as allodial
right holders and individual land users with lesser interests like customary freehold or sharecropping
arrangements (cf. Amanor ) was erratic (Interview G). Ofﬁcials dealt arbitrarily with compen-
sations for farmland and cultivated crops. At the same time compensation for the use of communal
forest resources was not paid at all (FGDs G, G). However, after more than three decades the
acquisition process cannot be exactly reconstructed.
. Even though GOPDC had the legal right to use the land for which it pays ground rent to the
Lands Commission, it abstained from using , hectares of its , hectares concession
because further expansion would have required the destruction of old-established villages and the
Apam shrine, a cultural heritage (Interview G).
. According to the Lands Commission, inﬂationary adjustment took place for delayed payments,
but we were unable to gain detailed information on this.
. We deﬁne ‘outgrowers’ as farmers who enter into a contract with GOPDC for a period of 
years. While the company offers inputs, credit and extension, the outgrower contributes labour
and land. This land is either owned or leased for  years. In the case of a lease, the landlord also
has to sign the contract. In contrast, GOPDC also provides the land for participants in the small-
holder schemes.
. So far, three Acts concerning land have been revised and adopted since the new constitution
was approved (almost adhering to the  months’ timeframe speciﬁed in the new constitution):
The Land Registration Act (No.  of ), the National Land Commission Act (No.  of )
and the Land Act (No.  of ) (Republic of Kenya a, b, c). However, the process has
been hasty, engagement of legislators and citizens has been lacking and the content falls short of
expectations (Manji ).
. The ongoing land reform process in Kenya is expected to effect changes in the process of
acquiring land. While it still follows the old legislation (prior to the new Constitution of ),
major changes in this process will be effected once the new constitution is fully implemented. For
instance, the following key issues are addressed (but at the time of writing had not been acted
upon) in the new constitution: (i) foreigners are no longer allowed to own land but can only take
leases and the time period of a lease is limited to  years (Republic of Kenya : Art.  ();
Glinz ), and (ii) a ceiling for the amount of land one can hold is to be discussed (Republic
of Kenya : Art. c).
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A P P E N D I X : I N T E R V I E W S
To guarantee the anonymity of the interviewees and focus group partici-
pants, we reveal their (rough) position and organisation but not their
names. All interviewees, in both countries, were informed about the
purpose of the interviews and how the data were to be used. Due to inter-
viewees’ reservations and the sensitiveness of the topic, interviews were
not recorded.
Ghana
Code Position/ Institution Gender Place Date
G Traditional authority a M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Traditional authority b M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Traditional authority c M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Manager a – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Executives outgrowers association M, M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Manager b – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Manager c – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Manager d – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Manager e – GOPDC M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – District Assembly M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Middle men M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
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G Ofﬁcial – OASL M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Snr. ofﬁcial a –Ministry of Food and
Agric.
M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Traditional authority d M Kwaebibirem
Dist.
..
G Representative – civil society F Accra  & ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial a – Lands Commission F Accra ..
G Ofﬁcial –Ministry of Food and Agric. M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial a – Land Administration
Project
M Accra ..
G Ofﬁcial – Ghana Investment
Promotion Centre
M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial b – Lands Commission M Accra  & ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial c – Lands Commission M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial b – Land Administration
Project
M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – OASL F Accra ..
G Snr. researcher – AGRA M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – IFPRI M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – Ghana Agric. Workers
Union
M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial d – Lands Commission M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial b –Ministry of Food and
Agric.
F Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – House of Chiefs M Accra ..
G Expert – Town and Country Planning
Dep.
M Accra ..
G Ofﬁcial –Water Resource
Commission
F Accra ..
G Professor – University of Ghana M Accra ..
G Snr. ofﬁcial – Environmental
Protection Agency
M Accra ..
Note: AGRA – Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa; IFPRI – International Food Policy
Research Institute; OASL – Ofﬁce of the Administrator of Stool Lands.
Kenya
Code Position/ Institution Gender Place Date
K Agricultural manager – Dominion Farms M Siaya ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial – AGRA F Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial – PSDA M Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial a – Kenya Investment Authority M Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial b – Kenya Investment Authority M Nairobi ..
K Ofﬁcial – Kenya Investment Authority F Nairobi ..
K Lawyer – Law Firm Nairobi M Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial –Ministry of Lands F Nairobi ..
K General manager – Dominion Farms M Siaya ..
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Focus group discussions
Each group set out to have between  and  participants. To reduce
hierarchy within the groups, we divided the participants into groups
according to their perceived wealth level, as well as their age (youth
groups up to the age of ). For employees of the investor, we used
the employment position to form different groups amongst casual
staff, contract workers and permanent staff.
Vulnerable
. in Ghana: no house or only a small structure, none or few domestic
animals, no bicycle, none or only a small piece of land.
. in Kenya: no house or only a small house, no domestic animals, no
bicycle, only a small piece of land, use of hoe to cultivate, children
not going to school.
(Cont.)
Code Position/ Institution Gender Place Date
K Chief – Government of Kenya M Siaya ..
K Extension ofﬁcer –Ministry of Agriculture F Siaya ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial – County Council Siaya M Siaya ..
K Fields ofﬁcer – NEMA F Siaya ..
K Human resources ofﬁcer – Dominion Farms F Siaya ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial – Kenya Land Alliance M Nakuru ..
K Lawyer M Nairobi ..
K Ofﬁcial – NEMA F Nairobi ..
K Ofﬁcial – Evaluation Department Ministry of
Lands
M Nairobi ..
K Ofﬁcial – Registration Department Ministry of
Lands
F Nairobi ..
K Surveyor – Land Development & Governance
Institute
M Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial –Water Conservation and Control
WRMA
M Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial a –Ministry of Agriculture M Nairobi ..
K Group Interview:  Snr. ofﬁcials –Ministry of
Agriculture
F, M,
M, M, M
Nairobi ..
K Snr. ofﬁcial c –Minstry of Agriculture M Nairobi ..
K Former Snr. ofﬁcial – Investment Promotion
Centre
M Nairobi ..
Note: AGRA – Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa; NEMA – National Environment
Management Authority; PSDA – Promotion of Private Sector Development in Agriculture;
WRMA –Water Resource Management Authority.
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Average
. in Ghana: medium-sized house, few animals, bicycle, school attend-
ance at primary and at often junior secondary level, little land owner-
ship, but cultivation of several plots under sharecropping.
. in Kenya: semi-permanent house (mud and then plastered), few
animals, bicycle, children go to a poor-quality school, at least two
acres of land, use of ox plough.
Wealthier
. in Ghana: big house, more animals, motorbike or car, often fewer
children, more extensive land ownership, cultivation of more than
ﬁve plots, often additional sources of income from non-farm activities.
. in Kenya: brick house, many cattle, motorbike, one wife, few children,
children go to a good school, ﬁve acres and above, use of tractor or ox
plough.
There are no gender-differentiated group discussions in our sample,
since our resources were limited. To compensate for this weakness, facil-
itators of FGDs were specially trained to encourage women’s partici-
pation. Moreover, male and female local experts denied that gender
was a critical factor in discussions related to topics such as community
history, the state of agriculture, and impacts of an investment
(Interview G, G & G). Evidence from the FGDs did not
support the common belief that the presence of men prevented
women from voicing their concerns. Discussions were led in local
languages (Twi, Fante, Luo or Kiswahili), recorded and then transcribed
into English. All participants were informed about the purpose of the
FGDs and how the data were to be processed. Before recording, we
obtained the consent of the group.
Ghana
FGDs were conducted with farmers and with employees of the investor.
In addition, we interviewed a group of smallholder farmers (contract
farmers without own land), a group of outgrowers (contract farmers
with own land) and a group of people awaiting compensation as their
village lies within the concession belonging to GOPDC. Groups from
Okumaning are located very close to the new GOPDC concession.
Groups from Aboabo are a little further away. The groups from
Asuom (outgrowers) and Kwae (smallholders) are in the neighbour-
hood of the old Kwae Concession, not in the neighbourhood of
L A R G E - S C A L E A G R I C U L T U R A L I N V E S T M E N T
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 May 2015 IP address: 213.39.242.4
Okumaning Concession, where neither of the contractual arrangements
has yet been implemented.
Kenya
FGDs were conducted with farmers and with employees of Dominion
Farms. For FGDs with farmers, two agricultural extension ofﬁcers in
Siaya District assembled farmers at Kadenge Chief’s Court. For employ-
ees of Dominion Farms, the local farm manager assembled groups.
Code Date Place Category
G .. Okumaning Plantation Casual workers – slashing – GOPDC
G .. Okumaning Plantation Permanent employees – GOPDC
G .. Okumaning Plantation Casual workers – harvesting – GOPDC
G .. Okumaning Rich before they received compensation
G .. Aboabo Youth
G .. Aboabo Average
G .. Okumaning Vulnerable
G .. Okumaning Average
G .. Congo To be compensated
G .. Okumaning Mixed: Average & wealthier
G .. Asuom Outgrowers
G .. Kwae Smallholders
Code Date Place Category
K .. Kadenge Vulnerable
K .. Kadenge Mixed: Vulnerable & average
K .. Kadenge Average
K .. Kadenge Wealthier
K .. Kadenge Youth
K .. Siaya Casual workers – Dominion Farms
K .. Siaya Contract workers – Dominion Farms
K .. Siaya Permanent employees – Dominion Farms
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